The normative social contract defended by Rousseau in Le Contrat social (1762) aims to respond to this sad state of affairs and to remedy the social and moral ills caused by the development of society. The distinction between history and justification, between the real situation of humanity and its coexistence, is of the utmost importance to Rousseau. While we should not ignore history or ignore the causes of the problems we face, we must solve these problems through our ability to decide how to live. Power never proves you right, even if it claims so often that it can. Whether social contracts are explicit or implicit, they provide a valuable framework for harmony in society. Following Pateman`s argument, a number of feminists have also questioned the nature of the person at the heart of contract theory. The liberal individual, the entrepreneur, is represented by the Hobbesian man, the owner of Locke, the “Noble Savage” of Rousseau, the person of Rawls in the original position, and the Robinson Crusoe of Gauthier. The liberal individual is supposed to be universal: raceless, genderless, classless, disembodied, and is seen as an abstract, generalized model of humanity that is capitalized. However, many philosophers have argued that if we take a closer look at the characteristics of the liberal individual, we do not find a representation of universal humanity, but a historically localized and specific type of person. C.B.
Macpherson, for example, argued that Hobbesian man is in particular a bourgeois man, with the qualities we would expect from a person during the nascent capitalism that characterized modern Europe. Feminists have also argued that the liberal individual is a special, historical, embodied person. (As well as race-conscious philosophers like Charles Mills, discussed below.) Specifically, they argued that the person at the heart of liberal theory and the social contract is gendered. Christine Di Stefano, in her 1991 book Configurations of Masculinity, shows that a number of historically important modern philosophers can be understood to develop their theories from the perspective of masculinity as conceived in modernity. She argues that Hobbes` concept of the liberal individual, which laid the foundation for the dominant modern conception of the person, is particularly masculine, because it is conceived as atomistic and solitary and owes none of its qualities or even its mere existence to another person, especially its mother. Hobbes` man is therefore radically individual, in a way that is specifically due to the character of modern masculinity. Virginia Held argues in her 1993 book Feminist Morality that social contract theory is implicitly based on a conception of the person who can be described as an “economic man.” The “economic man” is mainly concerned with maximizing his own interests considered individually, and he concludes contracts to achieve this objective. However, the “economic man” does not represent all people at all times and in all places. In particular, children and those who provide them with the care they need, who have always been women, are not adequately represented. The model of the “economic man” cannot therefore legitimately claim to be a general representation of all people. Similarly, Annette Baier argues that Gauthier`s concept that the liberal individual enters the social contract to maximize his or her own individual interests is gendered because he does not take seriously the position of the children or women who are normally responsible for caring for those children.
Community policing should not be seen as an entirely new theory. Many methods, concepts and strategies have been used by police services. Community policing has many fundamental components. It mixes and adapts to many tactics that fit the problems of the community. Community policing has adopted many theories and strategies to improve police law enforcement. The principles that people in the original position, behind the veil of ignorance, would choose to regulate a society at the most basic level (i.e. even before a constitution), are rightly called by Rawls the two principles of justice. These two principles determine the distribution of civil liberties as well as social and economic goods. The first principle is that every person in a society should have as much fundamental freedom as possible, as long as everyone is granted the same freedoms.
That is, there should be as much civil liberty as possible, as long as these goods are distributed equitably. (This would exclude, for example, a scenario in which there is a larger set of civil liberties than in an alternative scenario, but in which these freedoms are not evenly distributed among citizens.) The second principle is that, while social and economic inequalities can be fair, they must be equally accessible to all (i.e. no one should be denied access to greater economic benefits in principle), and these inequalities must be beneficial to all. This means that economic inequality is only justified if the most disadvantaged member of society is even better off than would be the case with other arrangements. Only when a rising tide actually carries all boats upwards can economic inequalities be addressed in a just society. The method of the original position supports this second principle, which is called the principle of difference, because if we stand behind the veil of ignorance and therefore do not know what our situation will be in society when the veil of ignorance is lifted, we will only accept those principles that are to our advantage. even if we find ourselves in the least favored position of society. After arguing that any rational person who adopts the original position and stands behind the veil of ignorance can discover both principles of justice, Rawls constructed perhaps the most abstract version of a social contract theory.
It is very abstract because instead of showing that we have signed or even signed a contract to found society, it shows us what we must accept as rational persons in order to be constrained by justice and therefore to be able to live in a well-ordered society. The principles of justice are more fundamental than the social contract as it has been traditionally conceived. On the contrary, the principles of justice limit this treaty and set the limits on how we can build society in the first place. For example, if we consider a constitution as a concrete expression of the social contract, Rawls` two principles of justice describe what such a constitution can and cannot demand of us. Rawls` theory of justice thus represents the Kantian limits to the forms of political and social organization that are permitted in a just society. Patriarchal control of women is found in at least three paradigmatic contemporary contracts: the marriage contract, the prostitution contract, and the surrogacy contract. Each of these treaties deals with the control of women by men or the control of a particular man over a particular woman in general. Under the terms of the marriage contract, a husband is granted the right of sexual access in most states in the United States, which prohibits the legal category of marital rape.